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Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive breakdown of the ongoing economic crisis in the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. It explores the backdrop of the crisis by analyzing Puerto Rico’s relationship 
with the U.S., macroeconomic indicators and pertinent legislations. It’s entirely unique contribution is the 
analysis of the newly introduced act- PROMESA, which enables Puerto Rico to restructure its debt. We have 
provided an explanation of the important sections of this legislation which govern the debt negotiation 
process. The PROMESA act has been extended to apply to other unincorporated territories of the United 
States as well should they run into arrears, which broadens the scope of this paper. We have extended the 
findings of pre-existing body of work on sovereign debt restructuring hurdles and explained how PROMESA 
addresses them. We have also used previous works to suggest measures to expedite Puerto Rico’s debt 
restructuring process with creditors. This paper could also serve as a handbook for creditors looking to 
navigate through the post-PROMESA debt restructuring process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Puerto Rican Debt Crisis is an ongoing financial crisis related to the amount of debt owed by the 
Government of Puerto Rico. It has already defaulted on portions of its debt including millions on May 2, 2016. 
On July 1, it defaulted on an additional $2 billion including $800 million of constitutionally backed General 
Obligation debt. The then Governor of Puerto Rico, Alejandro García Padilla issued a debt moratorium halting 
payments on all debt obligations which has resulted in litigations and the investment done is at risk. The 
President of United States of America, at the end of June 2016 signed into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, 
Management and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) which seeks to address the lack of legal framework 
available to the territory and extends its net to all the territories of the US, should they ever default. The move 
to install a control board comes after US Supreme Court decision on a case, Puerto Rico vs Franklin California 
Tax-Free Trust, which found a previous attempt by Puerto Rico to restructure its debt, unconstitutional. This 
decision ended any illusion Puerto Rico had of economic sovereignty. Left with no alternative, the Puerto Rico 
will have to make-do with the legal framework now provided by the United States Government. The legal 
framework, the PROMESA bill creates a seven-member panel and is tasked with bringing more than $70 
billion public debt under control. The board also has broad sweeping powers to reconfigure Puerto Rico’s 
financial and economic policy. The board will be able to facilitate binding negotiations with creditors and, if 
needed, a court-supervised restructuring. Amidst all this, the recent Zika outbreak in Puerto Rico has 
exacerbated the bundle of responsibilities on the Puerto Rican Government. Add that with the galvanizing 
political movement that has called the board, “Colonial Outrage”. A popular slogan is on the lips of protestors 
and activists - “CARAJO LA JUNTA”. A delicate situation has arisen on the island. This research paper seeks to 
shed light on the new legal framework –Oversight Board established under the PROMESA bill and the role 
that board members must play in helping the island out of the financial crisis. 
 
An Overview of the Puerto Rican Economy and Macroeconomic Indicators: Like most other developing 
economies Puerto Rico’s major economic sector was agriculture in the early 20th century.  The key economic 
drivers today are manufacturing; ensued by the service industry i.e. finance, insurance, real estate, and 
tourism. The World Bank classifies Puerto Rican economy as a high income economy. Puerto Rico’s economy 
remains closely tied to that of the United States. This is because Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory of 
the United States, decided after the Supreme Court’s Insular Cases that defined the relationship as “A territory 
appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within revenue clauses of 
the Constitution”. Broadly speaking, the territorial economy is influenced by three things.   
 
Firstly, and most importantly is the legislation pertaining to the island, be it monetary or fiscal policy 
directed by the Congress: The Jones Act made all inhabitants of the territory a United States citizen. The key 
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features of this Act include establishment of bill of rights, power to the residents to elect a Governor for a 
term of four years and exempting Puerto Rican bonds from federal taxes, state taxes as well as local taxes. We 
shall see in the later part of the paper how this piece of legislation has shaped Puerto Rican economy and 
created hurdles albeit unwittingly. The Merchant Marine Act created problems for the island as the ships had 
to first go through U.S. ports before heading to Puerto Rico. This resulted in inflated costs of goods brought to 
the island, consequently affecting tourism and the island ability to compete with other Caribbean islands. 
Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code under which Sec. 931 was replaced with sec. 936. Its aim was 
to promote economic growth on the island by giving companies tax exemptions thereby incentivizing 
corporations to invest and manufacture in Puerto Rico. Axiomatically, Puerto Rico experienced dramatic 
growth from 1950s leading up to the mid ’70s. Economic indices indicate a growth rate comparable to the 
well-known, pronounced growth of East Asia. The massive increase in GDP per worker in 1980 made Puerto 
Rico one of the “world’s most developed Latin societies” (Velez-Hagan, 2015). Section 936 became unpopular 
in the early 1990’s as many saw this as a way for large corporations to avoid paying taxes. Section 936 was 
then phased out, over a ten-year period, fully repealed in 2006. The subsequent elimination of this tax 
exemption also contributed and co-relates to a slump in the territorial economy.  
 
Secondly, the economic shocks felt by the mainland had direct and perhaps greater effect on Puerto 
Rican economy: The 1973-75 recessions in the mainland due Oil Crisis and the 1980’s energy crisis’s effects 
lasted longer on the island than compared to the mainland. According to a Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
(BBVA) report, it costs Puerto Rico an estimated $750 million for a mere $10 increase per barrel of oil 
imported, decreasing the Puerto Rican GDP. “According to the American Enterprise Institute, a $10 per barrel 
increase also eats away a half percentage point off the global gross domestic product (GDP)” (McPhaul, 
2005).The economic boom in the 1990’s helped the economy to recover but at the turn of millennium the 
island suffered a decade-long contraction, relying for the major part, on transfer payments and other public 
assistance from the U.S. It is clear from Figure 1 that the economic shocks felt by the mainland were in turn 
felt by the island. This makes it imperative to remark that the “free association” that Puerto Rico has with 
United States leaves to island’s economy vulnerable to the mainland’s economy. It is clear from above that the 
mainland economy and the policies implemented by them played a role in boosting growth in Puerto Rico up 
to the top and the economic shocks received by the mainland were in turn felt by them. 
 
Lastly, the internal policies and politics have played a crucial role in shaping the Puerto Rican 
Economy: The Government has spent considerable amount of their capital on building infrastructure, 
waterworks and roadways. These development projects have lacked proper estimates and the Government 
has routinely taken short term loans to cover the costs that shot out from the misleading estimates. In an 
attempt to jumpstart the economy, which began contracting earnestly back in 2006, the government went on 
a spending spree to build new infrastructure that would create new jobs, increase connectivity that would 
lead to greater labor mobility. However, this ambitious drive lacked accountability in general and inefficient 
use of capital has resulted in a massive debt that the government cannot make interest payments without 
cutting key government services like healthcare, education and public safety. “Garcia Padilla administration’s 
ties to political fundraisers haven’t truly broken into the mainstream media. Hernandez, along with nine 
other Puerto Rican businessmen and officials, was arrested in December 2015 as part of an ongoing FBI 
corruption investigation into Padilla’s government” (Mazzella, 2016). These and other such widespread 
allegations of graft and corruption, over decades, have inflamed the already volatile economic conditions on 
the island. 
 
The doubling of oil prices from 2005-12 inflated their cost for power generation. The increased cost of 
import, amounting to 3 percent of GNP increase in oil bill could have been used by the Government to support 
its local economy (Figure 2).  Another factor to the debt crisis in Puerto Rico is that of the real estate crash in 
2013. Due to the decade long recession and the heavy debt on the government, few want to buy a house in the 
island. Since Puerto Ricans are United States citizens, many are simply packing up and moving to mainland 
(Figure 3). Puerto Rico ranks 2nd for homes in foreclosure in the United States. This trend is likely to continue 
and more homes will enter foreclosure process seeing how people are choosing to leave the island and move 
to mainland. The Federal Minimum Wage is applicable to the island making it mandatory to pay the federal 
minimum wage of $7.25 an hour in spite of the island’s economy being vastly different from mainland’s 
economy. As shown in the Figure 4, the Federal Policy of Labor is making people in Puerto Rico unemployable 
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– a result visible from the territories’ unemployment rate is 12.4 percent that is twice more than the 5.5 
percent of the mainland. 
 
Higher minimum wages increases cost of hiring for businesses thereby reducing employment. Puerto Rico, 
which has the ratio of minimum wage to the median wage of 77 percent - 24 percentage points higher than 
Florida which has the highest minimum wage in United States of America. The local regulations which relate 
to overtime, paid vacation are costlier than the mainland. Fewer jobs for the people mean fewer taxpayers 
and more dependency on welfare and public services. These contribute to additional government spending 
(Figure 5).Outmigration is on the rise due shrinking job opportunities. The Planning Board’s projection of 
population till 2020 continues to fall at negative 1 percent per year. This data, as shown in Figure 6, does not 
take into account additional economic problems that may occur during/after debt restructuring. Apart from 
the decrease in demand from the island, the labor force will continue to shrink unless major initiatives are 
undertaken to curb this activity. The energy costs have fallen with the falling oil prices but cost per hour 
kilowatt is several times higher than that of the mainland. This raises the cost of locally produced goods and 
subsequently growth of economic sectors. Due to the higher cost of goods and services, the island finds it 
hard to compete with other Caribbean islands. The public enterprise (PREPA) uses old technologies and is 
inefficient. Cost of energy and water supply problems have flared up, discouraging numerous companies and 
industries from moving their operations in Puerto Rico. 
 
2. The distinctive Puerto Rican Problem 
 
Before we dive into a discussion regarding the possible ways of debt relief and restructuring, it is imperative 
that we take a look at the issues which make solving the Puerto Rican debt crisis a unique problem. The island 
of Puerto Rico has been a U.S. Territory since 1898 and Puerto Ricans have become U.S. citizens since 1917. 
Politically, Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory of the United States, which means that it does not enjoy 
the privileges of being a state. This has historically divided the people of the island and been a subject of four 
referendums so far, the latest of which took place on November 6, 2012, which resulted in a slender majority 
of the populace asking for a complete statehood, some asking for sovereignty and the others wishing to stick 
with the status quo. The most important economic implication of the “unincorporated territory” status is the 
unavailability of the option to resort to the Chapter 9 bankruptcy code. “Chapter 9 is a bankruptcy proceeding 
that provides financially distressed municipalities with protection from creditors by creating a plan between 
the municipality and its creditors to resolve the outstanding debt. Municipalities include cities, counties, 
townships and school districts” (“Investopedia”, n.d.). 
 
Basically Chapter 9 is the provision to restructure the debt but since territories are not included in the 
Chapter 9’s definition of municipalities, this option remains unavailable to Puerto Rico. The woes of the 
Commonwealth being unable to restructure its debt is further compounded by the following clause under 
Article VI (General Provisions) Section 8 of the Puerto Rican Constitution: “In case the available revenues 
including surplus for any fiscal year are insufficient to meet the appropriations made for that year, interest on 
the public debt and amortization thereof shall first be paid, and other disbursements shall thereafter be made 
in accordance with the order of priorities established by law.” Thus the General Obligation bonds issued by 
Puerto Rico take precedence in terms of getting paid first before any other government expenditures 
including other bonds. This is ensured by the “clawback provision” which means redirecting revenues to pay 
for the bonds guaranteed by the government of Puerto Rico. The clawback provision came to attention 
especially when, in December 2015, “Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla signed an executive order to permit 
the redirection of revenue budgeted for highway and convention center bonds and other agencies to pay for 
debt issued or guaranteed by the commonwealth” (Kaske, 2015). However temporary fixes like these served 
as nothing more than ominous indicators of the inevitable financial peril that was looming large over the 
island. 
 
To cut down on public spending hundreds of schools have been closed down in the past half-decade making it 
increasingly difficult for students to find a school nearby while some bus companies have declined service to 
students for lack of finances. Hospitals and emergency wards are also suffering from lack of funds resulting 
into power outages. “At least 629 cases of Zika infection have been confirmed, and it is projected that up to 20 
percent of the Puerto Rican population could become infected this year, according to data from the Centers 
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for Disease Control and Prevention” (Calmes, 2016). It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the 
Applied Ethics and philosophical implications of deciding a debt hierarchy to determine if it is more moral, for 
a state under duress, to pay a General Obligation bond holder or say pension benefits of a retired state-
employee. Although even from a socio-political standpoint it seems difficult to reason how severe austerity 
measures, ones suggested by the GO bond holders, would result in a long term solution without social unrest. 
 
Deciphering PROMESA: The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act (Hereafter 
referred to as PROMESA) at first glance has a whiff of being more of a conciliatory document for several 
special interest groups, creditors unions and the concerned mainland American citizens over having to 
sponsor a bailout at the taxpayer’s expense. A more careful reading of the bill reveals a lot of new features of 
interest and suggests that the drafters of the legislation have learnt their lessons from the previously 
bankrupt US Municipalities and also from sovereign debt negotiations. While the bill enjoyed majority 
bipartisan support in the House of Representatives, where it was introduced, several Democrats and leaders 
from Puerto Rico expressed their reservations raising the specter of colonialism but begrudgingly supported 
the bill. Puerto Rico has tried and exhausted every legal option available to restructure its debt and in the 
wake of losing an important Supreme Court decision on June 13, 2016 over the legality of Recovery Act, which 
was described by Justice Sotomayor as “the only existing legal option for Puerto Rico to restructure debts”, 
PROMESA seems to be the only resort. The cornerstone of the PROMESA act is the Oversight Board. The 
Oversight Board has exclusive control to ensure that the Fiscal Plans are enacted and enforced, and that all 
necessary reforms are undertaken to put the island on a path to access credit markets. 
 
Let's take a look at some of the important sections in this piece of legislation: Under the provisions for 
membership laid out in Title 1, the Oversight Board shall consist of 7 members. These members shall be 
appointed by the President from among the nominees provided by various leaders of Senate and House of 
Representatives as specified. One of the 7 members shall be either the Governor of Puerto Rico or his 
designee and will act as an ex officio member with no voting rights. The unavailability of voting rights to the 
island’s representative might be to ensure that the Oversight Board remains neutral in coming up with a plan 
which is in ‘the best interest of the creditors’. The voting members of the Board amongst themselves shall 
designate one member to act as Chair. After this the Oversight Board shall formulate bylaws, rules and 
procedures governing it under this act. The Oversight Board will have an Executive Director appointed by the 
chair. The Executive Director and the personnel hired by him shall be paid for their services while the 
members of the Oversight Board will only be compensated for the expenses incurred while serving. It is 
interesting to note that an island battling with economic crisis has a Board imposed on it, the expenses of 
which will be borne by the island’s already heavily indebted Treasury (Hacienda). It is also apparent that 
instating an Oversight Board which performs the same task that a similarly empowered Puerto Rican 
Government would have done is redundant. However, an obvious positive impact of putting a Federal 
Oversight Board in charge would be a boost in the creditor confidence as the Board is tasked with passing 
balanced Fiscal Plans while also ensuring the best possible outcome for the creditors. 
 
Section 210. It is imperative to note from the onset that an act drafted and passed by the United States House 
of Representatives, Senate and the President of United States, clearly and unequivocally, under Sec. 210, 
distances the US from pledging full faith and credit for “the of any principal of or interest on any bond, note, 
or other obligation issued by the territory or territorial instrumentality”. (PROMESA of 2016). While Puerto 
Rico’s economic future is in the hands of a Board, constituted by the United States and vested with sweeping 
powers, the responsibility clearly doesn’t fall at the doorstep of the United States Federal Government. 
 
Section 104(e). One of the clauses, conspicuous by its presence not in a limiting manner but as an enabler is 
a glaring loophole so obvious it is almost euphemistic to call it one. The Section 104 - Powers of Oversight 
Board, allows its members “to accept, use, and dispose of gifts, bequests, or devises of services or property, 
both real and personal, for the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work of the Oversight Board”. (PROMESA 
of 2016). It is difficult to comprehend why the drafters of the legislation would feel the need to allow for this 
provision as it is not too difficult to see a potential conflict of interest arising out of this. It would seem worth 
noting at this juncture that the members of the Oversight Board only get reimbursed for their expenses and 
are not paid for their services. 
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Section 405(b) (1)-Automatic Stay upon Enactment. This section ensures that upon the enactment of 
PROMESA the creditors cannot seek injunctive action against Puerto Rico or its instrumentalities. This will 
provide some major breathing room for the commonwealth and the Oversight Board as it seeks to restructure 
the island’s debt. The automatic stay has already undergone its first test as Plaintiffs Brigade Leveraged 
Capital Structures Ltd. and two others approached the District Court of Puerto Rico to revoke the stay under 
Sec.405(e) and to challenge the constitutionality of the Moratorium Act but were shot down by the presiding 
judge who upheld the stay. This stay remains in effect until February 15, 2017 but could be extended by the 
Oversight Board’s discretion under Sec.405 (d). 
 
Section 405(j) - No Default Under Existing Contracts. This states that as long as the stay applies, no bearer 
of a liability claim can seek remedy based on contractual implication or applicable law. This closes another 
door for the creditors and forces them to come to the table for negotiations. “The term remedy here has a 
broader perspective which includes the right to- setoff, apply or appropriate funds, seek the appointment of a 
custodian (as such term is defined in section 101(11) of 9 title 11, United States Code), seek to raise rates or 
exercise control over property of the Government of Puerto Rico” (PROMESA of 2016). 
 
Section 407(a) Protection from Inter-Debtor Transfers. The said section provides some comfort to the 
creditors and also discourages the kind of avoidance behavior that got the island into the current economic 
debt in the first place. Under Sec. 407(b) the creditor is given the right to enforce action via the District Court 
against any state instrumentalities, in case of violation, after the stay period is over. 
 
Section 405(l). This assures the creditors that as long as the Oversight Board deems “it is feasible the 
Government of Puerto Rico shall make interest payments on outstanding indebtedness when such payments 
become due during the length of the stay” (PROMESA of 2016). The powers of the District Court have also 
been limited under PROMESA. Under Sec. 305 the court cannot, without the Oversight Board’s consent, 
“interfere with- (1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property or 
revenues of the debt; or (3) the use or enjoyment by the debtor of any income-producing property”. It is 
apparent that the Oversight Board has a Herculean task in front of it by the fact that under Title 2, it has the 
responsibility to both- provide adequate funding for public pension systems and respect the relative lawful 
priorities or lawful liens, as may be applicable, in the constitution. The Oversight Board is seeking to “create a 
firewall between the constitutionally protected creditor hierarchy and pensions in the development of Fiscal 
Plans”. 
 
Section 104(i) Voluntary Agreement Certification. Under this section, the territory or the covered 
instrumentality can enter a voluntary accord with the bearers of its bond claims to restructure its bond 
claims. This certification depends on whether a Fiscal Plan has been validated by that point in time or not. In 
case a Fiscal Plan has been certified then the Oversight Board has to take into account if the plan provides for 
a sustainable debt for the territory or its covered instrumentality. In case a Fiscal Plan has not been certified 
then it will be the Oversight Board’s sole discretion to certify if the plan provides for sustainable debt level of 
debt. Notwithstanding the above conditions, certification will also be provided “if an applicable Fiscal Plan 
has not yet been certified and the voluntary agreement is limited solely to an extension of applicable principal 
maturities and interest on Bonds issued by Puerto Rico or territorial instrumentality” (PROMESA of 2016). 
This applies, for a time frame of up to one year on the Bond Claims during which interest won’t be paid on 
claims on which a voluntary agreement is reached.  
 
Section 601 Creditor Collective Action. This section entails the Oversight Board to consult the issuer and 
separate the bonds into pools as follows: 
 “Not less than one Secured Pool for which a revenue stream has been pledged and separate pools for 
bonds of different priorities” (PROMESA of 2016). For the bonds which have no revenue stream 
pledged a separate pool shall be made. 
 “The Administrative Supervisor shall not place into separate Pools Bonds of the same Issuer that 
have identical rights in security or priority” (PROMESA of 2016). 
 “For each Issuer that has issued multiple Bonds, for at least some of which a guarantee of repayment 
has been provided by the Territory Government Issuer, separate Pools shall be established for such 
guaranteed and non-guaranteed Bonds”(PROMESA of 2016). 
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Apart from the certification of the Oversight Board as discussed above, a modification also needs to be 
submitted to the holders of the respective debt instruments by specified channels of communication. The 
qualifying modification must be consented to by the majority of the holders of outstanding principal amount 
in the pool and voted affirmative by at least 2/3rd of the Principal amount that is outstanding of the 
Outstanding Bonds in each Pool. If the modification passes successfully through these steps, the qualifying 
modification shall be presented to the United States District Court. The Court has the power to nullify the 
modification “if and only if the district court determines that such Modification is manifestly inconsistent with 
this section” (PROMESA of 2016). Once the modification receives the court's nod on having followed all the 
steps listed in the Section, the modification becomes binding even on those creditors that have expressed 
dissent. The binding nature of the modification ensures that there is no room for creditor holdout. There can 
be no further litigations by dissenting creditors once a qualified modification is passed by the specified 
majority of the creditor pool, consented by the territory, certified by the Oversight Board, and approved by 
the judiciary. This also helps speed up the negotiations required to restructure the debt. 
 
Section 602. Perhaps to quell the debate around international agencies like IMF potentially playing some role 
in Puerto Rico’s debt crisis on account of it being a territory, the penultimate Section 602 of the legislation 
makes it clear that “Federal, State, or territorial laws of the United States, as applicable, shall govern and be 
applied without regard or reference to any law of any international or foreign jurisdiction.” (PROMESA of 
2016).  
 
Negotiations with Creditors in post PROMESA world: Renegotiating debt can sometimes be very 
prolonged lasting for more than 10 years. It is important to understand various issues that prolong the 
renegotiation process. The economy of Puerto Rico, already down to its knees does not have the time for 
lengthy and protracted negotiations. Time is on Puerto Rico’s side as the debt restructurings now, on average 
take significantly less time than back in 1980’s and 1990’s (31 months) vs “Post Brady Era” (17 months). 
Argentina’s bond instrument re-issuing (which included global investors) in 2005 and Serbia’s 2004 
exchange of bank debt are the only exceptions that took more than 3 years to negotiate. Let us take a look at 
hurdles in restructuring process listed and explained by Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch (2012). 
 
3. Hurdles in Restructuring Process 
 
Creditor coordination failures, litigation, and holdouts: “Problem of creditor holdouts and litigation is 
widely seen as the main reason for delayed and inefficient debt restructurings. Creditor holdout scenario is 
when a creditor refuses to participate in a restructuring offer, so as to enforce better terms later” (Das, 
Papaioannou, and Trebesch, 2012, p.28).This is seen a major obstacle in creditor coordination failure, “mainly 
due to the shift from bank to bond financing in emerging markets. Intuitively, large bondholder groups may 
find it harder to coordinate and agree on a deal, compared to a small group” (Das, Papaioannou, and 
Trebesch, 2012, p.28).However, with the Oversight Board overseeing the debt-restructuring process, the 
Puerto Rican Government should make use of the Board Members’ expertise so that the problem of 
coordination is solved. Although Title 6 of the PROMESA takes care of litigations that can happen after a 
restructuring deal is negotiated, provided that the set procedure of debt-negotiation was followed, one needs 
to be alert nonetheless.     
 
Debtor policies and political risk: “In addition to creditor behavior, it is well known that debtor country 
policies, or in this case territorial policies, lack of transparency and insufficient communication with 
creditors, can contribute to failed or delayed restructuring processes” (Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch, 
2012, p.29). This issue is well addressed within PROMESA. For instance, Under Title 6 Sec. 601, there is 
provision for an Information Agent for each creditor pool for effective communication. Title 6 Sec. 601 
Subsection (D), also establishes well defined creditor pools, ensuring a concrete structure to enable creditor-
pool specific plans and effective communication. The legally binding nature of these modifications ensures 
maximum creditor participation during the negotiation stages.  In addition to this, the Oversight Board 
demands from the Puerto Rican Government to have certified fiscal and budgetary plans. If well executed, this 
could cut the time it takes to negotiate a new deal significantly. “All available evidence indicates that 
information sharing and closes consultations with banks and bondholders go hand in-hand with quick and 
successful restructuring. A frequent issue of disagreement is the disclosure of reserve amounts or of details 
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on prospective exchange offers. Creditors can, in Puerto Rico’s case ask for relevant information from the 
Oversight Board” (Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch, 2012, p.29). 
 
The disputes on non-disclosed debt buyback programs cannot happen here as all the negotiations have to 
follow a set procedure according to section 601 and the plan has to be certified by the Oversight Board which 
then proceeds to court to make it legally binding. These checks and balances ensure to almost utmost 
certainty that creditors will not have to deal with non-cooperation from the debtors. While the task of seeing 
that Debtor policies do not interfere with the negotiations process falls on both the Oversight Board and the 
Puerto Rican Government, the onus of maintaining political stability falls squarely on the territorial 
government.  Political instability and political economy problems play a role in increasing the time it takes to 
negotiate a restructuring. Elections, conflicts, widespread riots and general strikes, or the resignation of key 
government members can all cause delays in implementing a debt restructuring. Puerto Rico gubernatorial 
elections which were held on November 8, 2016 led to the election of Ricardo Rossello, a pro-statehood 
candidate as the Governor of Puerto Rico. The political parties have a crucial role to play in maintaining the 
political stability of the region. The winning party must undertake conscientious policy planning to correct 
the deep rooted structural problems that lie in their economy rather than inciting friction and spouting 
rhetoric. 
 
Retail Investors Vs Institutional Investors: While designing an exchange offer, the Government of Puerto 
Rico should keep in mind the type of investors they are dealing with. A range of exchange options allows 
investors to “choose among different new instruments when tendering their old claims, thus accounting for 
differing preferences across creditors. Retail investors tend to prefer new bonds with no face value reduction 
and are more willing to accept long maturity and low coupons” (Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch, 2012, p.23) 
Institutional investors prefer to go for bonds with a reduction in principal with a combination of shorter 
maturities and higher coupons. Accordingly, the government should take into account the type of investors 
that have invested in their bonds and design an exchange offer accordingly. 
 
Debt-sustainability: While debt-negotiations in progress, the debtor in order to achieve high participation 
rate, contain “carrot” features or “sweeteners” “that generate incentives for participation. Sweeteners can 
take the form of upfront cash repayments, advantageous legal features of the new bonds, or add-ons to the 
new instruments which may include higher interest rates”( Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch, 2012, p.22) The 
Government needs to thoroughly assess the feasibility of providing high interest rates on the new bonds and 
“how much”. This will include a careful scrutiny of revenue streams and the amount of liabilities. A step up in 
interest payments may bring the creditors on board the negotiations and successful restructuring would 
mark the end of crisis episode because the exchange of old into new debt instruments puts the country back 
on the path of debt sustainability.“However, restructurings do not always put an end to debt distress. Some 
countries continue to incur arrears after a completed restructuring process and there are many examples in 
which sovereigns implemented a series of subsequent restructurings” (Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch, 
2012, p.13). Thus, the Puerto Rican Government will have to carefully gauge how much interest they can offer 
on the new bonds so as the debt remains “sustainable”. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has endeavored to lay down the present economic condition of the island of Puerto Rico and 
provide a backdrop of the federal as well as territorial economic and legislative reasons as to why the 
commonwealth finds itself in the said condition. We have traced several usual macroeconomic indicators that 
are important in a distressed economy but especially pointed out indicators like the rate of migration, labor 
participation rate, minimum and median wages as compared to states, and how federal legislation like the 
Jones Act and Section 936 have affected Puerto Rico as a territory. We believe that with the passing of 
PROMESA act, both the creditors and the debtors have entered the uncharted territory of debt negotiations. 
We have analyzed this new piece of legislation which has bearing upon not just the case at hand but is a 
bankruptcy code for other unincorporated territories of the US as well. We have attempted to point out the 
unique features of this act and the concerns that it addresses and the ones it does not.  We believe that the 
members appointed to the Oversight Board have to perform a tough balancing act between managing the $70 
billion debt and continuing to fund the island’s $43 billion in pension liabilities. It is important for the 
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Oversight Board to recognize that while Fiscal Plans need to be balanced, too many budget cuts might be 
impractical if not from a moral, from an economic standpoint because when all's said and done, the American 
citizens of Puerto Rico need the basic public facilities and perhaps even more with a Zika outbreak on their 
hands. Some political leaders and concerned protesters have voiced the opinion that the Oversight Board 
raises a specter of colonialism for the island but after a careful reading of the legislation and comparing it 
with the pitfalls commonly experienced in debt negotiations, we believe that PROMESA is the best possible 
outcome for Puerto Rico, at the moment, to remove significant hurdles during and after the debt restructuring 
process.  The legislation alone does not guarantee its success; the 7 board members appointed to the 
Oversight Board must act in a bipartisan manner to ensure that normalcy returns to the island’s institutions 
and its people.  
 
We have analyzed past trends of sovereign debt negotiations to make pertinent suggestions to Puerto Rico 
and its bond issuing institutions about the ways to expedite the process and to ensure debt sustainability. It 
will be of great interest to see how the members of the Oversight Board co-ordinate with the Puerto Rican 
government and with the creditors to fulfill their daunting task. Only once the Oversight Board members are 
appointed and the negotiations begin, will us able to see in earnest how the legislation of PROMESA translates 
into action. How the inhabitants of the island react to the Oversight Board’s decisions and what effects 
PROMESA has on the debate surrounding the island’s political status in the future remains to be seen. We 
wish the Puerto Rican government a smooth debt restructuring process for the fate of an island and its entire 
people depends upon it. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Puerto Rico GDP annual growth rate 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com. 
 
Figure 2: Oil imports by Puerto Rico from 2005 to 2015 and oil prices during those years 
 
Source: “Puerto Rico- A Way Forward” by Krueger, A.O., Teja, R., and Wolfe A. 
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Figure 3: Investment Collapse (in % of GNP) from 2004-2014 and House Price collapse from 2005-
2014 
 
Source: “Puerto Rico- A Way Forward” by Krueger, A.O., Teja, R., and Wolfe A. 
 
Figure 4: Minimum Wage as a Percent of Median Wage. Comparison between Puerto Rico and 
American States 
 
Source: “Puerto Rico- A Way Forward” by Krueger, A.O., Teja, R., and Wolfe A. 
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Figure 5: Declining Labor Participation Rate owing to massive unemployment benefits and other 
reasons. 
 
Source: “Puerto Rico- A Way Forward” by Krueger, A.O., Teja, R., and Wolfe A. 
 
Figure 6: The Decline in Puerto Rican Population and Projected Decline
 
Source: “Puerto Rico- A Way Forward” by Krueger, A.O., Teja, R., and Wolfe A. 
